

command in mind, and he hit upon the idea with Jim Wright of Texas, a young Congressman at that time, to have a gasoline tax and dedicate it to the construction of this system. And, by golly, we did it. But there came a time when we in fact had done it, built the system, and yet a certain inertia, you might say, pushed us on and on, and we would just build another segment and yet another.

We finally came up with a better idea, though, as the chairman has indicated—a new national highway system which would supplement the Eisenhower interstate system. It would consist of only about 4 percent of the Nation's road mileage, but it would carry 40 percent of its traffic. And it would be a combined, cooperative effort of State governments and the Federal Government at its best.

In 1991, President Bush very much wanted to have this National Highway System, but in fact the Department of Transportation had not yet drawn it. We had a big meeting down at the Executive Office Building with a map of the country and lots of red lines over it, but it did not represent real highways. It just indicated what would be someday.

That someday has come. We will have until the 1st of October—am I correct?

Mr. WARNER. The 30th of September.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes, the 30th, the end of this fiscal year, to authorize this system. And this legislation does that. It does it in a timely manner, as anticipated. We have funds available. And we have very real needs.

We are not building new highways. We are maintaining and improving their capacity. The intermodal system was very explicit on the idea that you do not want to add to the mileage of the system, you want to make it more efficient. We made very clear our view that a free good—and these are free-ways—will be overconsumed. We made it clear that we were not in the least alarmed by the idea of pricing this good, as we do in points of congestion like tunnels and bridges.

We began the legislation—the conference report and the legislation itself—with a declaration of policy for the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. It said:

The National Intermodal Transportation System must be operated and maintained with insistent attention to the concepts of innovation, competition, energy efficiency, productivity, growth, and accountability. Practices that resulted in the lengthy and overly-costly construction of the Interstate and Defense Highway System must be confronted and ceased.

We went so far, Mr. President, as to require that this table of principles be printed up and provided to every member of the Department of Transportation—and they were. In this system, in the present bill, we find continued reference to those principles. We find ourselves completing the 4-year work that we were asked to do.

Note, "intermodal." It is one of the ironies of President, then captain, Eisenhower's journey across the country that to assume the railroads had been destroyed and you find you could not get from here to there in any effective way without them led to an interstate highway system which pretty soon had destroyed the railroads. And not necessarily a good idea.

We, of course, made it clear that by intermodal we mean not just vehicle transportation. We talk about rail. We talk about air links. We talk about sea links. In this particular legislation there is a specific provision, "Sec. 126, Intermodal Facility In New York. [The] engineering, design, and construction activities to permit the James A. Farley Post Office in New York, New York, to be used as an intermodal transportation facility and commercial center."

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will my colleague allow me to observe?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Surely.

Mr. WARNER. He said something about the destruction of the railroads? I am not sure the distinguished Senator from New York wanted to indicate the interstate highway system destroyed the railroads. I would think there was a period of time when there was a decline of passenger travel, but the railroads today are very strong in terms of freight transportation. And many of the things that Eisenhower was concerned about in terms of heavy equipment being moved—I am glad the Senator brought it back. It did jog my memory. I, too, went to the World's Fair of 1939 with my father. It was a memorable trip. But it was formulating in Eisenhower's mind through all those years. This was always in the recess of his mind.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. He got it built. General Motors thought it up, you might say.

And the Senator, the chairman, is highly correct. What we have seen is not the disappearance of the railroads but their disappearance as a principal mode of passenger transportation, save on certain corridors where it is efficient. If you were looking for the major reason for that—well, probably the airlines did it to continental transport, and the automobile. Although we may have overdone it. We had a very efficient rail system in Los Angeles, for example, which they closed down around 1950 and they wish they could get it back, now that it is probably too late.

In any event, with tribute to my friends once again, the Committee on Environment and Public Works brings to this floor a near unanimous measure. I have been 19 years in that committee, and I do not think I can remember many times in which we have had a party-line vote. We have tried to think about the environment. We have tried to think about public works in terms of national interests. If we have not always succeeded, it is not for lack of trying. Once again, we have done

that, and very much to be congratulated and thanked at a time when partisan issues rise, as they ought—but they rise a little higher even as we approach Presidential years. This is a good example of the capacity of the Senators between the different parties, different regions, different interests to cooperate and produce a fine bill.

I for my part want to congratulate all those involved. Senator BAUCUS is necessarily absent or he would be saying substantially the same things from the point of view of the High Plains even as I speak from the point of view of the island of Manhattan.

Mr. President, with great appreciation for all of the work that the Senator from Virginia has done, and with the expectation that we will now go forward and get it through the Senate in the same period, I want to thank him.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to reciprocate and thank again my distinguished colleague from New York. It was simply because he certainly handled the ISTEA legislation, and that in many respects gave rise to this national evolution of the highway system.

Mr. President, we are anxious to have Senators come to the floor for purposes of amendments. We will accommodate them as they arrive.

At this time, I see our distinguished colleague from Georgia who wishes to address the Senate I believe on a different subject.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, before I speak briefly on another subject, I would like to congratulate my friends from Virginia and New York on their leadership in this important area, and I think that they have indeed worked together very carefully and prudently in the Nation's interest. I congratulate them for that.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to speak just a few moments about the situation in Bosnia today and share with my colleagues some of my thoughts on the subject.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, under the leadership of Senator THURMOND, the chairman of the committee, has had a series of four hearings on the subject of Bosnia. We heard from a number of, I think, very well-informed witnesses.

We heard from, of course, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Bill Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Al Haig, and former President of the United States, President Carter, and another former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Jack Galvin, now retired,

former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger, former top official in the State Department, Richard Armitage, and retired Col. Harry Summers, a frequent writer on this and many other national security subjects.

Mr. President, I would like to express my disappointment—unrelated to the hearings but which took place simultaneously with our hearings last week—with the actions of the Clinton administration when they last week first delayed a vote in the U.N. Security Council, and then voted for the deployment of the French, British, and Dutch rapid reaction force to Bosnia which they at first opposed, but then deferring a decision on the financial cost for that force.

I understand this action on the part of Clinton administration was taken primarily because of a letter from Senate Majority Leader DOLE and House Speaker GINGRICH objecting to U.S. financing of the rapid reaction force.

I believe this is a serious mistake on the part of the Clinton administration, and on the part of the congressional leadership. I believe we will pay a price for this combined Presidential and congressional position in the years ahead with our allies.

Mr. President, the United States during the administrations of both President Bush and President Clinton voted for every U.N. Security Council resolution on Bosnia, and endorsed and supported the efforts of our NATO allies who are participating on the ground in Bosnia as a part of the U.N. Protection Force or UNPROFOR.

I myself disagreed with numerous actions that have been taken in Bosnia by both the United Nations and by NATO. Yet, we voted for it. Both Presidents—President Bush and President Clinton—voted in the Security Council for every one of these resolutions. Now we have our allies in difficulty. They are in difficulty on the ground. And that difficulty could intensify with the rapid reaction force that is now being inserted by our allies—not by America, but by our allies—which will be an integral part of UNPROFOR, and the cost should be underwritten to the same extent and in the same manner as all U.N. peacekeeping forces.

We will have another day and another time to determine how much the United States should pay for U.N. peacekeeping assessments. But that is a long-term challenge. The question now is whether or not we are going to support in any way financially a crucial force that is being put in to protect the U.N. peacekeepers and the NATO peacekeepers that we ourselves voted to put in Bosnia. It is the ultimate irony for our congressional leadership and for the Clinton administration to not fully support a much stronger NATO-U.N. rapid reaction force.

Mr. President, if the U.N. forces withdraw from Bosnia, the President of the United States has declared that he is going to help them with United

States forces. The United States forces that would be placed there to help with this withdrawal would be working with this rapid deployment force. I think it is very important for us to understand the consequences of our not being willing to help pay for a rapid reaction force. That force, deployed by our allies and working with the United States forces assisting in the withdrawal, would help alleviate some of the responsibility for the United States forces in that situation and make it possible for a lot less United States forces to be placed in Bosnia to help with the withdrawal, and finally, greatly reduce the danger to United States forces that may be interjected there if and when the withdrawal comes about.

So I find it ironic that we have congressional leadership as well as—at least at the beginning of last week—the administration leadership opposing the force that would help reduce the forces which the United States has to put in to help with withdrawal and also would certainly reduce the danger of U.S. forces being placed in that situation. I find that ironic.

I hope that both the leadership in the Congress and in the administration will reconsider their position on this because I think we will pay a severe price for this—if not in Bosnia, then in other parts of the world where we ask our allies to help us. Alliances are not simply for good times and for when things are going smoothly. Alliances and allies have to stick together when things are not going well and certainly when things are getting to the dangerous stage as they certainly are in Bosnia.

Mr. President, I would like to explain to my colleagues my views as to the policy that should be followed with respect to Bosnia. I would first state—and my friend from Virginia, who yielded the floor, participated in every one of the hearings and he certainly, I know, would agree with this statement—that every single witness we had before our committee for 4 days opposed the United States unilateral lifting of the embargo while our allies remain on the ground in Bosnia. Every single witness—not one supported the unilateral lifting of the embargo; 4 days of hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and not one single witness favored the unilateral lifting of the embargo while our allies are still in harm's way on the ground in Bosnia.

Mr. President, my own views about where we go from here—and there are no good answers here—my views are heavily influenced by my support for NATO and my observation of NATO over the last four decades where it has been the strongest alliance in the history of the world. NATO has helped bring about the end of the cold war on peaceful terms without an explosion, and it has helped bring about the freeing of millions of people behind the Iron Curtain without huge bloodshed, which could have easily happened. So

my views are influenced by both the history of NATO and also what we are going to need NATO to do in the future.

I also believe that we should do everything in our power to prevent Bosnia from further eroding the NATO alliance, any further than has already occurred. Make no mistake about it. It is entirely possible for us to erode NATO's credibility and viability without saving Bosnia. I start with the view that there is no good answer in Bosnia. A number of mistakes have been made which I will not recount here. And we have to deal with the situation as it presently exists where we have peacekeepers on the ground with no peace to keep, and with the warring parties apparently not wanting peace. One side views the peacekeepers as shields from which to launch an attack, and the other side that is taking most of the territory views NATO and U.N. forces as hostages for leverage and protection.

I favor one final round of diplomacy to ascertain if there is any possibility for a negotiated peace as called for last week in testimony before our committee by former President Carter, former NATO commander, General Galvin, and former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger. They all testified that we ought to have one more vigorous round of diplomacy. All of them had different emphases, but that was one common denominator of those three witnesses.

I also strongly agree with Dr. Schlesinger's comments that this peacekeeping mission cannot continue under present circumstances and that both NATO and the United Nations should acknowledge that, absent a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, it is time to withdraw the U.N. and NATO peacekeepers from Bosnia.

If after a reasonable period of time—and I favor setting a finite date for progress on the negotiated peace—if after that period of time there is no substantial progress, the U.N. forces should be withdrawn in an orderly manner. That is not going to be an easy task. U.S. forces should participate, in my view, in a NATO-led operation, as pledged by President Clinton, to assist in the U.N. withdrawal, and U.S. forces should come to the rescue of the forces of our allies if there is an emergency and if they come under an attack and there is no other capability available to rescue them. In other words, in a last-resort emergency situation, I would certainly favor supporting our allies on the ground when they are in extreme need.

Once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from Bosnia, the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia should be lifted, multilaterally if at all possible.

While this is all taking place, we should join with our NATO allies in a concrete plan of action to contain the conflict from spreading any further.

Secretary of Defense Bill Perry made it clear in our committee that the spread of that conflict would be against

America's "vital" interests. He used that term carefully. "Vital" means interests that are so important we are willing to go into conflict in order to protect them.

The spread of the conflict would engage both U.S. and NATO interests in a very important way. And I think we ought to make it abundantly clear, while we are making one last effort for a diplomatic solution and while we are preparing for an orderly withdrawal of U.N. forces—and I hope our allies will come to that view—we should make it absolutely clear that we intend as an alliance to prevent that conflict from spreading and to hold Serbia—by this I mean Belgrade, Serbia—responsible for any breach of borders beyond what has already occurred in that region.

Finally, those calling for withdrawal should realize that there will be a high price to be paid once the U.N. forces are withdrawn from Bosnia. This is no free ride here. This is going to involve some real consequences in all likelihood. Once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn, there is a high potential for atrocities, particularly in and around the eastern enclaves.

Even recognizing what may occur, it is, in my view, however, past time to face the reality on the ground. The international community has failed to restore peace. That failure must be acknowledged. Unless there is a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, the warring parties must be left to fight it out until one party prevails or until they are exhausted and ready at last at some point in the future to negotiate a peace agreement.

Mr. President, I repeat, there are no easy answers in Bosnia, and I hope that we will not search for easy answers but, rather, for a course of action that will do whatever we can to alleviate the suffering there, within reason, but to acknowledge, first and foremost, that the NATO alliance is an important alliance and we should not further erode that alliance.

I repeat, Mr. President, I hope that the congressional leadership, as well as the Clinton administration, will review the position that they have taken, with lukewarm support and no financial support, for a rapid reaction force now being deployed there by our allies. That will alleviate some of the responsibility the U.S. forces might otherwise have, and that will certainly reduce the danger of any kind of harm to U.S. forces that may have to be injected into that country to help with a withdrawal of U.N. and NATO personnel. I find it supreme irony that we would not be willing to pay our part for other people deploying troops that will be to our direct benefit and an activity that has been voted for by both President Bush's and President Clinton's administrations at every single turn in the U.N. Security Council.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. I thank my colleagues for letting me continue.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I detain the distinguished Senator from Georgia for a minute.

We were together at a private meeting with President Chirac, and information has come to my attention with regard to a meeting that President Chirac had here on Capitol Hill with the majority leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. I am told that in that meeting, President Chirac made it clear, after being specifically asked by the two leaders, that the rapid reaction force was not—and I emphasize not—being deployed to pave the way for an UNPROFOR withdrawal—indeed, had no relationship with NATO withdrawal plans.

I do not recall that subject being specifically addressed at the meeting that the Senator from Georgia and I had.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I read some of that in the newspaper, but I got a contrary impression. I always hesitate to quote a foreign leader in a private meeting, but I must say my impression was not consistent in the meeting we had, which was at the French Embassy, was not consistent with the reported statements of the President of France at the meeting with the congressional leadership that took place on the Hill. I did not hear anything like that in the private meeting that I had.

He also made it clear, I believe, that he hoped that the U.N. forces would be able to remain. But I did not hear any statement that would indicate that those rapid reaction forces would not be used if and when there was a withdrawal. As a matter of fact, those forces would provide the very first protection if U.S. forces had to go in to help in the withdrawal. This is the first time the United Nations has put a much more heavily prepared force in there, which has been one of the problems all along. When you have a lightly armed force, as the Senator from Virginia well knows, they are nothing but hostage invitations and that is what has happened. So I know that probably the leadership of some of our allied countries would prefer not to withdraw, but I believe that all of them would acknowledge if withdrawal is necessary, this rapid deployment force will be the key ingredient in the early stages of withdrawal.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I remember, in response to a question that I posed, that there was some discussion at our meeting with President Chirac about the mission of the rapid reaction force. And I am also told that same discussion took place here in the Capitol, at the meeting with the two leaders. When President Chirac was asked by the leaders what the mission of the rapid reaction force would be, President Chirac said that the rapid reaction force would not be deployed to implement the U.N. mandate to protect the safe havens, such as Sarajevo. The rapid reaction force would only be deployed to protect UNPROFOR.

It is my understanding that while Senator DOLE and Speaker GINGRICH did express support for the right of our allies to protect their troops, the leaders did not support the United States being assessed 31 percent for this European operation, given, in the judgment of the leaders, the futility—and I think the distinguished Senator from Georgia expressed the same judgment—of the UNPROFOR mission at this time.

So I hope, Mr. President, there will be some clarification of this in the very near future. I was also led to believe that the United Nations would soon be announcing some specific mission statements with regard to the new forces.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I share his feeling on this subject. I do not know what the President of France said in the meeting that I did not attend. I would not try to have any conjecture on that. But I do know that common sense tells us—I have met with the Ministry of Defense in Britain, I have met with the JCS staff here, the joint staff—I know that the withdrawal of those U.N.-NATO forces is going to be extremely complicated and complex.

But one thing the people in the eastern enclaves may feel is that it puts them in great jeopardy of being in harm's way after those forces leave. It may be very difficult to disentangle from those eastern enclaves. So it is going to be a very difficult situation.

I know something like this rapid reaction force will be essential—it has to be augmented—but it is an essential first step if there is to be a withdrawal. That is basic common sense. For us to be in a position of having pledged to come in and help with the withdrawal and urging withdrawal—and I think there are an increasing number of people urging withdrawal—and then not helping, or at least to even look like we are negative on the first step, which is for the allies to protect themselves, it seems to me that is contrary to our own best interest.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could just discuss one other point with my colleague. He referred to the Administration's proposal to allow U.S. forces to perform emergency missions, and he will recall in the hearing before our committee when Secretary of Defense Perry and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili were testifying, they put up a chart concerning the use of U.S. forces in an emergency situation. I think both my friend from Georgia and I were somewhat unclear as to exactly the context in which they were using "emergency."

If I can restate my concern and perhaps he can restate, once again, his use of the term here, it was not clear to me whether or not we would involve ourselves in emergency missions only if those emergency missions were a part of a withdrawal operation, or whether we would involve our ground forces in emergency missions prior to the determination to withdraw UNPROFOR.

Can the Senator clarify exactly what he said today with reference to "emergency"?

Mr. NUNN. I can clarify what I said. I hesitate to try and clarify what was said at that hearing, because I think there was at least implied conflict between what the Secretary of Defense was saying and perhaps what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, although I thought later in the hearing Secretary Perry made it much clearer as to what the administration had in mind.

I must say, in announcing that new dimension of possible U.S. ground force involvement, which occurred about a week prior to that, I did not think the administration ever made it clear as to what they intended. I can only give you my view, therefore, and that is I hope the United States will not have to put in any ground forces at all, but we clearly are pledged by the President of the United States to put forces in to help with the withdrawal.

If there are emergencies related to that withdrawal, we would be, I am sure, part of any effort to come to the relief of our allies. But assuming, before there is a withdrawal, there is some dire emergency, that our allies get into an extreme situation—and I hope that is not going to happen—with jeopardy to the lives of perhaps a number of people that are basically under a U.N. mandate, under those dire circumstances where there is no other force available, I personally would favor the President of the United States having that authority and he probably would assert that under his Commander in Chief authority, whatever we do in the Senate, he is able to come to the aid of our allies in that situation.

I just do not think you can have a successful alliance, if your allies get into an extremely dangerous situation, which you voted for and encouraged, and you leave them at their own peril to die in a situation where you could have taken steps to help alleviate that danger. So those are clearly my views. I do not say I speak for anyone else on that subject.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my colleague in expressing support for U.S. participation in an operation to withdraw UNPROFOR, if our participation is requested by our allies and necessary for the successful conclusion of the mission.

It is also my view that I hope we do not have to put ground forces in. But I think our President has indicated that they would be available to assist in such a withdrawal operation, if necessary. Clearly, under those circumstances, I would support the use of our ground and air forces to help in emergency situations associated with the withdrawal. But prior to the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR, the use of our forces in an emergency situation can have serious consequences, because the word "emergency" is really not definable. While it might be one

situation, it could be another and another and another, and very shortly, prior to a withdrawal decision, if we are involved in a succession of emergency situations, we are in it. Plain and simple, we are in the battle at that time. It would be a clear perception worldwide, and the use of the term "emergency" as justification, I feel, would disappear.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I understand his position on this. I think it is an area where I hope we do not have to get involved. Of course, in an emergency situation we already are involved. We are flying flights over Bosnia. I think the situation the Senator is directing his comments to is ground forces as opposed to air forces. We have been participating for a year or two. The fact is that we lost a plane and, fortunately, thankfully, we rescued the pilot.

I would call that an emergency situation. In that situation, we put air forces in—helicopters—and were prepared to put ground forces in at that time, and possibly had some on the ground at that time, to rescue a pilot. I hope if we needed the French to rescue that American pilot they would have been there. I would think if a French pilot went down tomorrow and they needed us and there was no other way, we would go in there and help that pilot. That is what an alliance is all about.

Mr. WARNER. I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator. There an emergency is very clear. A downed aviator, no matter what nation he may come from, is clearly in an emergency situation. But I am concerned about the gray area of other situations as it relates to the disposition of the UNPROFOR forces all over that region, oftentimes two or three individuals by themselves.

Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator makes a good point. I hope that kind of a situation would not develop. It may very well be that if we have some resolution on the floor, that we ought to leave that point without specific authority, perhaps, but leaving it up to the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief with consultation with Congress. It is hard to authorize that situation specifically, but to me it would be a fundamental error to preclude it, to block the resolution here. The Senator just acknowledged, if there was a British or French pilot that went down, we would want to help.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is part of a NATO operation. I think at this point we should also indicate the United States is also actively involved in a naval embargo in the Adriatic. In two ways, we are a very active participant in those NATO actions.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator is entirely correct.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair for allowing a colloquy with my good friend from Georgia.

In conclusion, we point out two areas that require further definition; namely,

the purpose for the rapid reaction force, as well as the meaning of "emergency." Those are areas in which I hope persons will step forward and provide clarification.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, before the Senator from Georgia leaves the floor, I would like to address a question to him along the lines of my colleague from Virginia. I, too, was at the hearing they were discussing earlier and I, too, raised questions about the emergency help that was being discussed and perhaps being offered by U.S. forces—the Senator from Georgia must catch a train and will not be able to stay, but perhaps I can talk to my colleague from Virginia, because I know he has some of the same concerns that I do.

I raised a question about the emergency nature of what our commitment would be: Would it be only in conjunction with the evacuation, or would it be any emergency that might arise in a reconfiguration effort?

It was my understanding in the hearing that we really were looking at any emergency, and I worry about that description because I believe that leaves us open to any conflict on the ground in Bosnia.

But then the Senator from Georgia also raised the issue of the air flights in which we do now participate, and I am concerned that we are not doing everything necessary to protect our forces in those overflights. For instance, the question was asked at that hearing—I am sure the Senator from Virginia remembers—the question was asked: Are we going to take out the missiles, or are we going to stop the overflights until there is cover? I would like to ask the Senator from Virginia if he, too, is concerned about the continuing flying efforts if we do not at least have an understanding about what our role is going to be, if we are going to take out the missile sites before we go forward, or if we are going to continue to put our flights in jeopardy?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for joining us in this very important colloquy. Indeed, we serve together on the Armed Services Committee, and she has taken a very active role in the policy formulations of the committee on this tragic situation in that part of the world.

Just recently, I say to my good friend, the Senator from Texas, I publicly said that our committee, the Armed Services Committee, has a responsibility to investigate very clearly the circumstances under which Captain O'Grady's mission was not performed in the accompaniment of other aircraft—aircraft which are specifically designed and equipped for suppression of ground-to-air missiles. And we will have to look into that, because no member of the Armed Forces of the

United States, wherever he or she may be in the world today, should ever be subjected to a risk, which risk can be lessened to some extent by the utilization of other assets possessed by the U.S. military.

The Senator will recall that General Shalikashvili said that some 69,000 missions had been flown successfully without a loss, such as Captain O'Grady, and that this particular mission was a longer route, where there had been—I think I quote him accurately—"no detection of ground-to-air systems," such as to justify the inclusion of other assets. Now, that is something we have to determine, because subsequently there to in those reports and the testimony of the general before the committee on which the Senator from Texas and I sit, came the reports that there had been some collection of signals in another area of our intelligence which lent themselves to the theory that there was present on that particular flight path a ground-to-air system. And in fact there was. So that is one of the things we have to ascertain. Twofold: Was there a breakdown in intelligence if in fact those signals were collected and confirmed? And, second, exactly what policies and procedures does the Department of Defense employ at such time as they put our uniformed people in a situation of great risk?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will just add to the two points that have been made by the Senator from Virginia that I think we also should inquire about exactly what flights we are going to participate in and if we are going to take some action to make sure that we either take out the missiles which had been suggested by NATO and vetoed by the United Nations earlier in this process, or if we should stop participating in those overflights, over that disputed territory, before we get into a situation where we have another of our young men shot down, as we witnessed.

Thank goodness we had a good result, because we now have Captain O'Grady back safe and sound. But I think these are very important points that the Armed Services Committee should look into before any kind of authorization is given, and I think there are a lot of questions to be asked. I thank the Senator for his leadership in this effort.

The Senator from Virginia has really been a wonderful conscience for this conflict. I appreciate the work he has done on the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Texas for her thoughtful remarks, and indeed I could say the same about the Senator from Texas and her participation in her years on the committee.

NATIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM DESIGNATION ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to know what the status of floor action is, because I have two amendments that are technical and have been agreed to by both sides, which I would like to propose.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the matter before the Senate is the underlying bill, am I not correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WARNER. Amendments are now in order, and I note that the distinguished Senator from Texas has several amendments, as reflected on the documents submitted to us. This would be an appropriate time to take those into consideration.

AMENDMENT NO. 1424

(Purpose: To change the description of a rural access project in Texas)

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Texas [Mrs. HUTCHISON] proposes an amendment numbered 1424.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in title I, insert the following:

SEC. 1. RURAL ACCESS PROJECTS.

Item 111 of the table in section 1106(a)(2) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-240; 105 Stat. 2042) is amended—

(1) by striking "Parker County" and inserting "Parker and Tarrant Counties"; and
(2) by striking "to four-lane" and inserting "in Tarrant County to freeway standards and in Parker County to a 4-lane".

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this is indeed a technical amendment. It just adds Tarrant County to the list of what counties may be included in this rural access projects. The reason is because a little bit of work needs to be done in Tarrant County for the Parker County project that was already approved.

ISTEA section 1106(a)—rural access projects—contains a project to upgrade an existing highway to four lane divided highway in Parker County, TX. In order to complete this project as envisioned, some work must be undertaken in neighboring Tarrant County.

However, ISTEA makes no mention of Tarrant County in the project authorization and there is a question at TXDOT as to whether it can complete the project through Tarrant County with the ISTEA-authorized funds since Tarrant is not specifically named in ISTEA by virtue of oversight.

I am offering a technical amendment to ISTEA which extends authorization to complete the project as intended in Tarrant County. This amendment does not authorize any additional funds.

Passage of this language has become critical because work undertaken

under the ISTEA rural access authorization has reached the Tarrant County line and Congress must clarify that it may continue so that the Texas Department of Transportation may complete the project.

The House has included this technical correction in every original legislation in 1991. It also was included in last year's NHS bill and will likely do so again in this year's version. I thank the chairman and ranking minority member of the Environment and Public Works Committee for their support in rectifying this small, but important, problem in Tarrant County.

Mr. WARNER. I understand that amendment is essentially a technical correction to the ISTEA legislation. The managers are prepared to accept it. I would like to await the arrival of my comanager before doing so.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so that I may offer another amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 1425

(Purpose: To change the identification of a high priority corridor on the National Highway System in Texas)

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Texas [Mrs. HUTCHISON] proposes an amendment numbered 1425.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 36, strike lines 2 and 3 and insert the following:

Interstate System.";

(2) in paragraph (18)—

(A) by striking "and"; and

(B) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ", and to the Lower Rio Grande Valley at the border between the United States and Mexico"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this amendment would extend high-priority corridor 18 from where it currently ends in Houston, TX, all the way to the Mexican border in the lower Rio Grande Valley.

Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, corridor 18 now extends from Indianapolis, IN, through Evansville, IN, Memphis, TN, Shreveport/Bossier, LA, terminating in Houston, TX. Corridor 18, along with corridor 20—from Laredo to Houston—are together popularly referred to as I-69.

Extending corridor 18 to the Rio Grande Valley will expedite the shipment of goods traded between Mexico, the United States, and Canada by providing a direct link from the Canadian border to the Mexican border through the heart of the United States. Eighty